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LIABILITY FOR BLOOD TRANSFUSIONS RESULTING IN
SERUM HEPATITIS
A blood transfusion, once considered a major surgical event, has be-
come a standard practice. Despite the most meticulous and up-to-date
precautions, however, statistics show that approximately one of every
one hundred patients receiving a blood transfusion becomes infected
with serum hepatitis as a result of the presence of a hepatitis virus in the
blood used for the transfusion.' In effect, such a patient runs the risk
of an illness which, if not fatal, will at least result in an infirmity lasting
between six months and one year. Who shall bear the financial burden
of the illness and its treatment? The unfortunate patient? The hospital
or the blood bank supplying the blood, despite the probability that
neither was negligent?
By the use of various rationales, the courts have generally determined
that the loss shall be borne by the patient. Some courts have settled
this problem by simply granting hospitals and blood banks an across-
the-board charitable immunity. Others have said that no "sale" of
the blood took place, and have therefore denied recovery to patients
who had based their claims on a warranty theory. Still others have
denied recovery on the reasoning that since no test as yet exists for
determining the presence of this virus in blood, and since no method
as yet exists for removing the virus, it is unreasonable to require the
supplier of blood to warrant his product to be free from the serum
hepatitis virus.
It is similarly unreasonable to force unfortunate patients to bear a
loss which they have in no way caused. It is conceivable that through
a program of governmental regulation and indemnification of hospitals
and blood banks, the harsh results of this situation could be eliminated.
Such a program would be similar to the protection already afforded by
many states to persons injured by uninsured or hit-and-run motorists.2
1. Trout, Blood Transfusions, 73 DicK. L. REv. 201, 212 (1969). See generally 202
J.A.M.A. 27 (1967).
2. An example of such protection is New Jersey's Motor Vehicle Financial-
Responsibility Law, N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6 (1961). Briefly, it provides that persons
injured by uninsured or hit-and-run motorists shall have a remedy against a fund
maintained by the state. The injured party may recover his loss in an action against
the fund, so that in effect the state has undertaken to indemnify uninsured or hit-and-
run motorists so that its citizens shall not suffer from the acts of such parties.
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NEGLIGENCE AND THE DOCTRINE OF CHARITABLE ImmUNITY
Some injured patients have attempted recoveries predicated on theories
of negligence. Cases of this type encounter two major obstacles: the
doctrine of charitable immunity, and the fact that no test can determine
or prevent the presence of the serum hepatitis virus in the blood used
in transfusions.8
The doctrine of charitable immunity has been repudiated, at least
partially, in most jurisdictions. At present, less than a dozen states
still grant complete immunity to charitable organizations, 4 while the
number of those that grant no immunity at all is growing.5 Between
these extremes lie the jurisdictions which grant a partial immunity only,6
but the trend toward ending charitable immunity is clear. In the past,
this immunity has been based on one of two theories, either that a
beneficiary of a charity has waived his remedy and assumed the risk
of negligence by the charity when he has accepted its benefits,7 or that
to hold charities liable for tortious injury is violative of public policy.8
Opponents have argued that it is more equitable for the community
to bear the burden of loss by holding liable an institution, like the hos-
pital, from which the entire community benefits, rather than to force
the individual to bear the entire loss.9 They have reasoned that "men
must be just before they are generous .. ." 10 Despite the fact that the
3. 202 J.A.M.A. 27 (1967). Research in this area is being conducted at the present
time. However, nothing effective has as yet been developed.
4. See Randall, Medicolegal Problems in Blood Transfusions, 20 S.C. L. REv. 1, 4
(1968); ANlrOT., 25 A.L.R.2d 35 (1952). Those jurisdictions which grant complete
immunity include: Arkansas, Maryland, Missouri, Ohio, Oregon, Pennsylvania, and
South Carolina. See also 3 A.L.R.2d LATER CASE SERVICE 743-44 (1965).
5. Randall, supra note 4, at 4. Those states granting no immunity at all include:
Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, California, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Florida,
Georgia, Iowa, Kansas, Kentucky, Michigan, Minnesota, Mississippi, Montana, New
Hampshire, New Jersey, New York, North Dakota, Oklahoma, Puerto Rico, Utah,
Vermont, and Wisconsin.
6. Annot., 25 A.L.R.2d 35, 143-200 (1952).
7. Id. at 68.
8. Id. at 70.
9. Id. at 59. See generally Ray v. Tucson Medical Center, 72 Ariz. 22, 230 P.2d 220
(1951); Cohen v. General Hospital Society, 113 Conn. 188, 154 A. 434 (1931).
10. Tucker v. Mobile Infirmary Association, 191 Ala. 572, 68 So. 4, 12 (1915). The
court here simply reasons that it better serves the public interest to hold all members
of the public liable for their torts. Despite the fact that a charity undertakes to
perform a duty voluntarily and for little or no compensation, the public interest is
better served if that fact does not give the charity license to perform the duty negli-
gently. The charity, while wishing to perform an act of benevolence, must first account,
as does anyone else, for its acts of wrongdoing.
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situation which gave rise to the doctrine of charitable immunity no
longer exists and the reasoning upon which it was based is no longer
applicable,1' it continues to survive in some jurisdictions, although the
trend, as noted above, is toward the repudiation of charitable immunity
for hospitals.
The second major obstacle that a patient faces in seeking recovery
based on negligence is proof that the hospital or blood bank is guilty of
actionable negligence. Certain kinds of negligence are obvious, such
as the negligent performance of the transfusion itself, the mismatching
of blood types, or the mislabelling of the blood used in a transfusion.
However, these negligent acts rarely result in the patient's becoming
infected with serum hepatitis. Since this infection results from the
presence of the virus in the blood, the patient, to recover, must con-
vince the court that the use of blood or plasma containing the serum
hepatitis virus was in itself a negligent act.12 Generally, courts have
been unwilling to hold this to be a negligent act. In Fischer v. Wilming-
ton General Hospital,3 the plaintiff, a patient who had received a
whole blood transfusion and contracted serum hepatitis as a result,
alleged that the hospital had been negligent in permitting its agents to
administer the transfusion using blood containing the serum hepatitis
virus. Plaintiff further contended that the hospital had also been
negligent through its agents' failure to advise her of the possible danger
of serum hepatitis in blood transfusions. The court noted'that "[d]e-
fendant's affidavits establish indisputably that there is no known medical
technique by which the virus which causes hepatitis can be detected
or destroyed in the whole blood." '4 The court further stated that
".... the issue ... would appear to be whether the known risk here
involved was of a type which imposed upon defendant a duty to warn
plaintiff in advance." Is The court concluded that since all possible
precautions against the virus had been taken, and since testimony had
11. Brown, Stare Decisis is Worth Its Weight in Reason: Abolish the Charitable
Imramity Doctrine, 46 A.B.AJ. 629 (1960). See also President and Directors of
Georgetown College v. Hughes, 130 F.2d 810 (D.C. Cir. 1942).
12. If the patient can prove no other negligent act on the part of the defendant
hospital, he is logically reduced to this single contention: that the use of whole blood
in a transfusion by a hospital, in the light of the knowledge that it could contain the
hepatitis virus and that there is no way to prevent or discover this, constitutes in itself
a negligent act.
13. 51 Del. 554, 149 A.2d 749 (Super. Ct. 1959).




shown that the psychological upset which the patient might suffer if
advised of the risk could outweigh the beneficial effects of the trans-
fusion itself, 16 the hospital was neither negligent in performing the
transfusion nor in failing to advise the patient of the possible risks
involved.
It is important to distinguish between transfusions involving whole
blood and those involving plasma, for medical science has developed a
method by which plasma can be made safe from the serum hepatitis
virus. This process involves storing the plasma at room temperature for
a period of approximately six months, thereby eliminating the hepatitis
virus and rendering the plasma safe. 1'7 Statistics conclusively show that
this method is completely effective with regard to plasma,' 8 although
no effective method is yet available to produce similar results with
whole blood.19 The implications are clear: granted the availability of
a method by which plasma can be made safe, failure of the hospital
or blood bank to use this method, or the use of whole blood where
plasma would have sufficed could be viewed as negligence on the part
of the hospital or blood bank for which the injured patient could be
allowed to recover.
Although no method is yet available by which whole blood can be
made absolutely free of the serum hepatitis virus, this circumstance
does not give hospitals and blood banks license to exercise anything less
than maximum precaution in this area. Failure to do so may constitute
negligence for which injured patients could recover. Recent research
has shown positive correlations between environment, medical history,
and personal contacts of the donor, and the presence of the hepatitis
virus in the blood.V 0 Tests have been developed which can detect the
16. Id. at 753.
17. Note, Liability for Blood Transfusion Injuries, 42 MxNx. L. REv. 640 (1958).
See generally Pooled Plasma witb Little or No Risk of Homologous Serum jaundice,
154 JA.M.A. 103 (1954).
18. Note, supra note 17, at 656-57.
19. Id.
20. Garibaldi, A New Look at HospitaPs Liability for Heptatitis Contaminated Blood
on Principles of Strict Tort Liability, 48 Cn. B. REcoRD 204 (1967). The writer states:
Research has developed a relationship of the instance of viral hepatitis
to environment. Tests have shown that only 10 per cent of patients (po-
tential blood donors) tested for viral hepatitis showed positive results in
new, middle-class, residential areas; whereas, in older, more crowded
areas of lower economic status, 33 per cent tested positive; and ward
patients who lived in old, overcrowded, low-income areas tested 91 per
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possibility that a prospective donor may be a carrier of the virus.2' If
a blood bank or hospital fails to investigate the donor's medical his-
tory, or fails to administer these tests, such failure could constitute a
breach of the duty owed to the prospective donee, for which he should
be allowed a recovery.
IMPLIED WARRANTY ATTACHED TO THE "SALE" OF BLOOD
Some plaintiffs have attempted to base their claims on a warranty
theory, contending that the blood used in their transfusions was sold
to them, and therefore the presence of the virus in the blood constituted
a breach of an implied warranty that the blood was safe.22 The land-
cent positive. In other words, any blood from a donor of the third group
would have a nine to one likelihood of affecting the recipient of the blood.
Id. at 206.
21. Persons once infected may remain carriers; accordingly, the medical
history of each potential donor should be taken by the hospital and
carefully examined. Hospitals and blood banks can and should take particu-
lar care to ascertain whether records indicate that any past recipient of
blood from the donor has ever contracted hepatitis. There are several tests
for prospective donors, which indicate whether a particular donor might
be carrying the virus, including (a) thymol turbidity test, (b) urine
bilirubin test, and (c) elevated serum glutamic oxalactic transaminase
activity. The National Institute of Health requires exclusion of donors who
within the preceding six months have had contact with a known case of
hepatitis and donors who have had a transfusion or infusion of human
blood, plasma, or serum.
Id.
22. Very briefly, the theory of such a case begins with the contention that the
supplier of the blood is a "merchant" as defined in UNIFOMv COMMERCIAL CODE
5 2-104(1). The Code states that "merchant" means
a person who deals in goods of the kind or otherwise by his occupation
holds himself out as having knowledge or skill peculiar to the practices
or goods involved in the transaction or to whom such knowledge or skill
may be attributed by his employment of an agent or broker or other
intermediary who by his occupation holds himself out as having such
knowledge or skill.
The patient then contends that under section 2-106(1), the transfer of the blood to
him is "the passing of title from the seller to the buyer for a price" and is therefore
a sale, to which, under sections 2-314 and 2-315, the implied warranties of merchant-
ability and fitness for a particular purpose attach. Under section 2-314(2) (c) the
patient contends that the implied warranty of merchantability was breached by the
presence of the hepatitis virus in the blood, which he contends makes the blood
unfit for the ordinary purpose for which it is used. Under section 2-315 the patient
contends that the implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose was breached in
that he relied on the supplier's skill and judgment in the selection of the blood, and
the presence of the hepatitis virus therein made the goods unsuitable for the purpose
for which they were selected.
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mark case on this point is Perlmutter v. Beth David Hospital,23 wherein
a separate charge for the blood used in the transfusion was itemized
on the patient's hospital bill. Plaintiff contended that-there had been a
sale of the blood, and that the blood contained serum hepatitis virus
which ultimately infected him. The sale of defective blood, therefore,
constituted a breach of warranty. The court rejected plaintiff's con-
tention, stating that the contract between plaintiff and defendant hos-
pital was one primarily for services; the transfer of the blood to the
plaintiff was merely incidental to this contract for services, and there-
fore no warranties attached to the blood itself. Nearly all jurisdictions
which have been presented with this issue have adopted a similar view.24
The vigorous dissent in Perlmutter stated that ". . . plaintiff is not
suing defendant for the service of injecting the blood into her blood-
stream, but simply for the sale of 'bad' blood for a separate valuable
consideration .... ," 25 The dissent further stated that while the primary
purpose of plaintiff's dealing with defendant was service, the transac-
tion was divisible into separate contracts, one for service and one for
the sale of physical material, the blood used in the transfusion.
We have had no difficulty whatever in the past in frequently
distinguishing between medical and administrative acts... recog-
nizing that the contract is divisible, and, while we have held hos-
pitals immune when they have carefully selected persons supplying
human skill, we have never extended that doctrine to physical
material which was bad .... 26
The dissent concluded that the transfer of the blood to the plaintiff
constituted a sale, and the presence of the hepatitis virus was a breach
of the implied warranty which attached to such sale.
23. 308 N.Y. 100, 123 N.E.2d 792 (1954).
24. Sloneker v. St. Joseph's Hosp., 233 F. Supp. 105 (D. Colo. 1964); Whitehurst v.
American Nat'l Red Cross, 1 Ariz. App. 326, 402 P.2d 584 (1965); White v. Sarasota
County Pub. Hosp. Bd., 206 So.2d 19 (Fla. App. 1968); Lovett v. Emory Univ., Inc.,
116 Ga. App. 277, 156 S.E.2d 923 (1967); Balkowitsch v. Minneapolis War Memorial
Blood Bank, Inc., 270 Minn. 151, 132 N.W.2d 805 (1965); Goelz v. J. K. & Susie L.
Wadley Research Institute & Blood Bank, 350 S.W.2d 573 (Tex. Civ. App. 1961);
Dibblee v. Dr. W. H. Groves Latter-Day Saints Hosp., 12 Utah 2d 241, 364 P.2d 1085
(1961); Gile v. Kennewick Public Hosp. Dist., 48 Wash. 2d 774, 296 P.2d 662 (1956);
Koenig v. Milwaukee Blood Center, Inc., 23 Wis. 2d 324, 127 N.W.2d 50 (1964).
25. 308 N.Y. at 108-09, 123 N.E.2d at 796.
26. Id. at 111, 123 N.E.2d at 798. In support of this statement the dissenting opinion
cites Volk v. City of New York, 284 N.Y. 279, 30 N.E.2d 596 (1940) (involving an
impure morphine solution).
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Although most courts have chosen to follow the majority opinion in
the Perlmutter case, there are three jurisdictions which have held that
such a transaction is in fact a sale. One is New Jersey where, in Jackson
v. Muhlenberg Hospital,7 the court held that a transfer of human blood
for a consideration is a "sale" within the meaning of the Uniform Com-
mercial Code, section 2-106(1). The court, nevertheless, refused to
impose a warrantor's liability upon the defendant hospital, reasoning
that "[t]he means available for avoiding the risk of harm and the ex-
tent of the risk must be weighed against the utility of the product." 28
Crucial in the court's decision were the considerations that not only
were there no means available to eliminate the virus from the whole
blood, but defendant had so stated on the container in which the blood
was bottled. This was ruled to be an effective warranty disclaimer.29
The court concluded that despite the fact that a sale of the blood took
place, as a matter of policy no warrantor's liability could be imposed
upon the supplier of the blood since the virus could not be eliminated
from the blood and the utility of the product far outweighed the po-
tential danger to the donee. 30
27. 96 N.J. Super. 314, 232 A.2d 879 (1967).
28. 232 A.2d at 886.
29. Id. at 888. The court based this holding on UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE
5 2-316(2) and N.J. STAT. ANN. § 12A:2-316(2) (1962) which state that to exclude the
implied warranty of fitness for a particular purpose the disclaimer must be in the
form of a conspicuous writing. The disclaimer was placed on the container and read
as follows:
Despite the utmost care in the selection of donors, human blood may
contain the virus of Homologous Serum Hepatitis. Therefore Eastern
Blood Bank does not warrant against its presence in this blood.
The court reasoned that this disclaimer was not unreasonable or unconscionable, and
therefore held it valid as disclaiming liability in case the blood proved unfit for
transfusion due to the presence of the hepatitis virus. As to merchantability, the court
in effect equated this with plaintiff's contention that defendant was strictly liable
in tort for supplying a defective product which was unreasonably dangerous to the
ultimate consumer. The court, quoting at length from RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 402(A), comment k at 353-354, reasoned that a product's utility and necessity must
be weighed against its potential harm to the consumer in determining whether it is
defective and/or unreasonably dangerous. The court concluded that blood must be
classified as an "unavoidably unsafe product," the utility of which far outweighs its
potential danger. The court states unequivocally that this refusal to impose strict
liability, which is in effect a warrantor's liability on an implied warranty of merchant-
ability, is a rule of policy. ld. at 886.
30. It must be noted, that while the court in the Jackson case never actually stated
that blood containing the serum hepatitis virus is merchantable, such an implication is
clear from the reasoning employed by the court. The failure to state this explicitly
was due to the fact that the plaintiff chose to litigate the issue of strict liability rather
[Vol. 12:86
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In accord with the Jackson case is Cunningham v. MacNeal Memorial
Hospital,31 where the Illinois Supreme Court held that such a transfer
of whole blood by a hospital to a patient is a sale. The court held
merely that the plaintiff, in alleging that she had received a transfusion
from defendant hospital, with blood sold to her by the hospital, and
had contracted serum hepatitis therefrom, had stated a valid cause of
action against the defendant based on a theory of strict liability. As to
whether plaintiff would be able to recover from defendant, the court
indicated that it would base its ultimate decision on whether the de-
fendant could have removed the hepatitis virus from the blood.3 2 The
court further indicated that as a matter of policy, no liability could be
imposed upon defendant if no means were available to accomplish this
removal. 3
In agreement with these decisions as to a commercial blood bank,
but not as to a hospital, is Russell v. Community Blood Bank, Inc.3 4
The Florida court held that the transfer of blood by a blood bank was
a sale, 5 and that plaintiff's allegation that she had contracted serum
hepatitis as a direct result of the presence of the virus in the transfused
blood was sufficient to state a cause of action against defendant blood
bank on a theory of breach of implied warranty.36 The court further
stated, however, that plaintiff would be able to recover only if she
could prove that the blood bank could have eliminated the virus from
the blood.3
It appears the better approach in affixing liability under the warranty
doctrine is that taken by the three minority jurisdictions. The opposing
Perlmutter view employs the artificial reasoning that the patient's con-
tract is one for services rather than for a sale. This position is difficult
than that of implied warranty of merchantability. Nevertheless, by equating the two
the court made its position on the merchantability of blood containing the hepatitis
virus unmistakably clear. 232 A.2d at 884.
31. 113 IM. App. 2d 74, 251 N.E2d 733 (1969).
32. 251 N.E.2d at 738-39.
33. Id.
34. 185 So.2d 749 (Fla. D. Ct. App. 1966), afi'd, 196 So.2d 115 (Fla. Sup. Ct. 1967).
The court accepts the Perinutter case "service" theory as to a hospital, reasoning that
it is primarily a service organization, but adopts the "sale" theory as to a blood bank
which the court classifies as a commercial enterprise.
35. Id. at 752.
36. Id. at 755-756. Since the court did not state which implied warranty the plaintiff
might rely upon, one may assume that the court means both the implied warranty of
mechantability and that of fitness for a particular purpose.
37. Id. at 755.
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to rationalize in light of the decisions involving the "sale" of food in a
restaurant where the contract is mainly for services. Section 2-314(1)
of the Uniform Commercial Code specifically provides that the serving
of food for consumption on the premises is a "sale" of such food. Surely,
there can be no clearer example of a transaction the primary purpose
of which is a service, yet the transfer of goods from the restaurant to
the customer for a price included within this transaction is considered
a separate contract for a sale. Nevertheless, the courts which follow
the Perimutter view have refused to apply this principle to the analogous
situation of a patient who, in procuring the services of a hospital, pur-
chases a container of whole blood to be used for the purpose of a trans-
fusion.38 The New Jersey, Illinois and Florida courts present a more
logical argument in stating that a sale does in fact take place in cases
of this type, but that as a matter of policy they feel it would be im-
proper to impose a warrantor's liability upon the supplier of the blood
since no method is available to him to make the blood safe.
EQUITABLE CONSIDERATIONS: DISTRIBUTION OF LIABILITY
The courts are confronted with an extremely difficult choice between
two alternatives, neither of which is equitable to all the concerned
parties. One alternative dictates that a patient who has to undergo a
transfusion must risk the possibility of being exposed to the virus, while
the other alternative would penalize an innocent hospital or blood bank
for a sickness which it is absolutely incapable of preventing. There are
several factors which the courts must consider in determining which
party shall assume the risk of this possible loss. Equitably, these factors
center around an estimation of which of these two innocent parties is
more capable of bearing the loss. It appears, at first glance, that the
patient is the less capable, for his financial reserve is often miniscule
when compared to that of modern hospitals and blood banks; but a
closer examination discloses that this is often not correct. Some hos-
pitals and blood banks can perform between one and two hundred blood
transfusions each week. To place the risk of loss upon these organiza-
tions might be to condemn them to defend one or more lawsuits every
week, necessitating the devotion of enormous amounts of their financial
resources to this purpose to the detriment of the general public. It has
38. For an elaborate discussion of the failure of the courts following the Perlmutter
view to recognize this analogy and apply the principal stated in the UNIFORM COM-
MERCIAL CODE § 2-314(1), see Comment, Sales: Implied Warranty: Blood Transfusion,
18 OxLA. L. REv. 104 (1965).
[Vol. 12:86
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been suggested that the hospitals and blood banks could defray these
extra expenses by increasing charges for their services,3 9 but the effect
of such a proposal would be to raise these charges to an exorbitant
level. The increased revenues would not be drawn from the general
public, only from that segment of the public in need of hospital care.
Despite the fact that the hospital may have recourse against a third
party supplier of the blood, 40 the third party will cover this expenditure
by correspondingly increasing the price of blood so that the ultimate
effect will be the same. Furthermore, insurance coverage for this lia-
bility will be almost impossible to procure, for the fact remains that a
sizable loss will be incurred at least once every hundred times the risk
is taken. Finally, it hardly seems just to penalize the hospital or blood
bank for the consequences of the patient's unfortunate position.
Under the present system it is clear that the patient, however un-
fortunate he may be, is more capable of assuming this risk than the insti-
tutions with which he deals. Yet the result of this policy is harsh, and
often calamitous, from the patient's point of view. An alternative solu-
tion must be found by which all parties can be at least partially accom-
modated.
PROPOSED SOLUTION: A CHANGE IN THE LAW
The solution appears to be to devise a plan which holds down medi-
cal expenses while allowing the injured patients some measure of finan-
cial recovery, and to fund such a plan with the resources of the general
public since it is the general public which benefits from the services
of hospitals and blood banks. An analogous plan does exist, and is in
use in some states today to protect the citizens against losses due to
acts of uninsured or hit-and-run motorists.41 Each state could set up
a commission which would license blood banks or hospitals dealing in
blood for transfusion purposes. No organization would be able to
participate without a license, and by withholding licenses from any
organization that did not comply with the commission's standards, the
commission could effectively regulate hospitals and blood banks to
ensure that the maximum possible precautions and preventative meas-
ures against serum hepatitis virus are taken. The commission might be
funded by the state's tax revenues, and from these funds it would
39. Id. at 109.
40. Id.
41. E.g., N.J. STAT. ANN. § 39:6 (1961).
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indemnify every licensed supplier of blood for any liability they might
incur as a result of the presence of the hepatitis virus in the blood they
have supplied, assuming, of course, a finding of no other grounds for
liability on the supplier's part.
The injured patient's remedy would be a statutory one against the
commission and the supplier of the blood, and his recovery would be
paid from the funds available to the commission. Since total compen-
sation from this fund would be unfeasible, a ceiling would have to be
placed on the amount any patient could recover. This ceiling amount
would be determined from the amount of funds available to the com-
mission, and the anticipated number of claimants.
The major advantage of this plan is that it benefits all parties con-
cerned to some degree, as opposed to the present state of the law which
leaves the injured patient without a remedy. There would also be no
danger to the financial security of hospitals and blood banks, as re-
coveries would not be paid from their resources. Medical expenses
would not be increased for the same reason, and the service organiza-
tions would feel no increased strain on their finances. The plan offers
the injured patient at least some mitigation of his loss. Furthermore, by
funding the plan with tax revenues, the expense of this system would
rest upon the public, ensuring maximum diffusion of expense and mini-
mum actual cash outlay by each individual.
While the present state of the law forces the patient to assume the
risk involved in a blood transfusion, neither the patient nor the hospital
or blood bank is capable of assuming the entire risk alone. It is there-
fore incumbent upon the legislatures to adopt some method, such as
that herein proposed, so that the general public may be both served
by the hospitals and protected from the dangers of serum hepatitis.
GEORGE S. NEWMAN
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